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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk
An interesting problem confronted by the solicitor and disposed of
by him, as set forth in solicitor’s opinion 144, is published in this month’s
issue. A corporation declared a stock dividend of an amount equalling
its accumulation of profits from February 28, 1913, to the date of the
issuance of the dividend. It then declared and paid a cash dividend out
of its earnings accumulated prior to February 28, 1913. The manner in
which the solicitor arrived at the conclusion that “the cash dividend con
stitutes a taxable distribution under section 201 of the revenue act of
1918” is most interesting. It is difficult for the lay mind to follow the
solicitor’s reasoning and it may be that his position would not be sustained
were the question taken to the courts for adjudication.
The attorney general has given an opinion on “the basis of deter
mining taxable gain and deductible loss in case of property acquired
prior to March 1, 1913, and sold or disposed of subsequent thereto.” To
those who wish to be informed on the latest ruling on this subject we
commend the reading of treasury decision 3393 published herein.
Section 231 of the revenue act of 1918 exempts certain organizations
from taxation. Paragraph 10 of that section reads as follows:
“Farmers’ or other mutual hail, cyclone or fire insurance companies
* * * * of a purely local character the income of which consists
solely of assessments, due and fees collected from members for the
sole purpose of meeting expenses.”
The kind of an organization thus described is exempt from taxation. A
corporation which according to its description by the board of appeals
and review is a
“reciprocal indemnity exchange through which certain individuals, firms
and corporations conduct a limited insurance on the reciprocal or inter
insurance plan, through an attorney in fact, the O Company, having
power to issue policies, collect premiums and adjust losses; it further
appears that each subscriber acts individually and deposits a fixed
amount to pay losses; that such deposit is held by the attorney in fact
and is kept in a separate account in the name of the depositor and at
the end of the period for which the insurance runs, any balance of the
amount so deposited goes to the depositor”
claims exemption under the provisions of sections 231 (10) quoted above,
but was denied such exemption.
Read the recommendation of the board of appeals and review and
learn how narrow a line can be drawn between that which must and
must not be present for such a corporation to be ruled exempt. This
company deposited amounts in advance of the “assessment” and to take
care of the expenses and losses when accrued and were incurred. A
solicitor’s opinion rendered prior to the consideration of this case had
defined “assessment” as implying “a payment in which the policyholder
has no further right or claim. In other words the essence of an assess
ment is that the amount thereof is dedicated to the payment of losses or
expenses incurred or to be incurred with no right on the part of the
person paying the same to a refund of any portion thereof, while a
premium deposit contemplates a return or the right to a return to the
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policyholder of the part of the amount deposited not needed for the pay
ment of losses, etc.”
Verily, the processes of the legal mind are difficult to comprehend.
TREASURY RULINGS
(T. D. 3393, September 12, 1922.)
Income tax—Opinion of the Attorney General.
Basis for determining taxable gain or deductible loss in the case of
property acquired prior to March 1, 1913, and sold or disposed
of subsequent thereto.
Where property acquired prior to March 1, 1913, is sold or disposed
of thereafter—
1. A taxable gain is realized if the selling price is greater than the
value on March 1, 1913, and if that value is greater than the cost
thereof, to the extent that the selling price exceeds the value on
March 1, 1913.
2. A taxable gain is realized if the selling price is greater than the
cost and if the cost is greater than the value on March 1, 1913, to the
extent that the selling price exceeds the cost of the property sold or
disposed of.
3. No taxable gain or deductible loss results if the selling price is
greater than the value of the property on March 1, 1913, but less than
the cost thereof.
4. A deductible loss results if the selling price is less than the value
on March 1, 1913, and if that value is less than the cost, to the extent
of the difference between the value on March 1, 1913, and the selling
price.
5. No taxable gain or deductible loss results if the selling price is
less than the value on March 1, 1913, but greater than the cost.
6. A deductible loss results if the selling price is less than the cost
and if the cost is less than the value on March 1, 1913, to the extent
that the cost of the property disposed of exceeds the selling price thereof.
The following opinion rendered by the attorney general under date
of August 23, 1922, respecting the basis to be used for determining tax
able gain or deductible loss in the case of property acquired prior to
March 1, 1913, and sold or disposed of subsequent thereto is published
in full for your information and guidance:
Department of Justice,
Washington, August 23, 1922.
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of June
26, 1922, in which you request my opinion as to the proper basis to be
used, under the revenue acts of 1916, 1917, and 1918, in computing the
taxable gain or deductible loss in the case where property, acquired prior
to March 1, 1913, is sold or disposed of thereafter. Accompanying your
letter was a brief submitted by the M company, in which the validity of
the regulations of the internal revenue and the procedure thereunder are
questioned by the company specifically as to the following cases:
Where property acquired prior to March 1, 1913, is sold subsequent
thereto at a price which is—
(a) Greater than the value thereof on March 1, 1913, which was
higher than cost, or
(b) Greater than the cost thereof, which was higher than the value
on March 1, 1913, or
(c) Greater than the value thereof on Maresh 1, 1913, but less than
cost, or
(d) Less than the value thereof on March 1, 1913, which was less
than cost, or
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(e) Less than the value thereof on March 1,. 1913, but greater
than cost, or
(f) Less than the cost thereof, which was less than the value on
March 1, 1913.
The provisions of the revenue act of 1916 material to the subject
under consideration, and not changed in any way by the act of 1917, are:
Sec. 2. (a) That, subject to such exemptions and deductions as are
hereinafter allowed, the net income of a taxable person shall include
gains, profits, and income derived from * * * businesses, trade, com
merce, or sales, or dealings in property whether real or personal, growing
out of the ownership or use of or interest in real or personal property,
also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any
business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income
derived from any source whatever;
(c) For the purpose of ascertaining the gain derived from the sale
or other disposition of property, real, personal, or mixed, acquired before
March first, nineteen hundred and thirteen, the fair market price or value
of such property as of March first, nineteen hundred and thirteen, shall
be the basis for determining the amount of such gain derived.
Sec. 5. * * *
(a) For the purpose of the tax there shall be allowed as deductions—
Fourth. Losses actually sustained during the year, incurred in his
business or trade. * * *; Provided, That for the purpose of ascer
taining the loss sustained from the sale or other disposition of property,
real, personal, or mixed, acquired before March first, nineteen hundred
and thirteen, the fair market price or value of such property as of March
first, nineteen hundred and thirteen, shall be the basis for determining
the amount of such loss sustained;
Fifth. In transactions entered into for profit but not connected with
his business or trade, the losses actually sustained therein during the
year to an amount not exceeding the profits arising therefrom;
*

******

Sec. 10 * * * For the purpose of ascertaining the gain derived
or loss sustained from the sale or other disposition by a corporation,
joint-stock company or association, or insurance company, of property,
real, personal, or mixed, acquired before March first, nineteen hundred
and thirteen, the fair market price or value of such property as of March
first, nineteen hundred and thirteen, shall be the basis for determining
the amount of such gain derived or loss sustained.
The act of 1918, dealing with the questions propounded, are:
Sec. 202. (a) That for the purpose of ascertaining the gain derived
or loss sustained from the sale or other disposition of property, real,
personal, or mixed, the basis shall be—
(1) In the case of property acquired before March 1, 1913, the fair
market price or value of such property as of that date; and
(2) In the case of property acquired on or after that date, the cost
thereof; or the inventory value, if the inventory is made in accordance
with section 203.
Sec. 213. That for the purpose of this title * * * the term “gross
income”—
(a) Includes gains, profits, and income derived from * * *
trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether
real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in
such property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the
transactions of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or
profits and income derived from any source whatever * * *.
T. D. 3206 reads in part as follows:
Regulations No. 45 (1920 edition) are hereby amended in order that
the rule announced by the supreme court in the cases of Goodrich v.
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Edwards and Brewster v. Walsh, respecting the basis for the determina
tion of taxable gain or deductible loss in the case of property acquired
prior to March 1, 1913, and sold or disposed of subsequent thereto, may
be incorporated therein. * * *
Art. 1561. Basis for determining gain or loss from sale.—For the
purpose of ascertaining the gain or loss from the sale or exchange of
property the basis is the cost of such property, or if acquired on or
after March 1, 1913, its cost or its approved inventory value. But in
the case of property acquired before March 1, 1913, when its fair market
value as of that date is in excess of its cost, the gain which is taxable
is the excess of the amount realized therefor over such fair market
value. Also in the case of property acquired before March 1, 1913, when
its fair market value as of that date is lower than its cost, the deductible
loss is the excess of such fair market value over the amount realized
therefor. No gain or loss is recognized in the case of property sold
or exchanged (a) at more than most but at less than its fair market
value as of March 1, 1913, or (b) at less than cost but at more than its
fair market value as of March 1, 1913 * * *.
In the case of Goodrich v. Edwards (255 U. S. 527) the question
of what constituted gain within the meaning of the revenue act of 1916
was passed upon by the United States supreme court, which adopted a
concession made by the solicitor general to the effect that where no gain
was realized by the taxpayer on a complete transaction, notwithstanding
that the selling price was higher than the value on March 1, 1913, no
tax should have been assessed against him; holding that section 2 (c)
was applicable only where a gain over the original capital investment
had been realized after March 1, 1913, from a sale or other disposition
of property, establishing the rule that increases in value occurring prior
to March 1, 1913, should be excluded in computing taxable gain, and
that only increases occurring subsequent to such date should be taxed.
Taxable gain having been thus construed by the Supreme Court, it
follows that “deductible loss” should have the same construction, the
provisions relating to losses being practically identical with those relating
to gain. In making the concession as to taxable gains, the solicitor
general, in his brief in the Goodrich cases cited above made the further
concession that a loss on the complete transaction must have been sus
tained in order to make it a deductible loss, and that only the loss
occurring subsequent to March 1, 1913, should be allowed as a deduction.
The provisions of the revenue act of 1913 which deal with the sub
ject of taxable gains and deductible losses are:
Sec. 202 (a) That for the purpose of ascertaining the gain derived
or loss sustained from the sale or other disposition of property, real,
personal, or mixed, the basis shall be—
(1) In the case of property acquired before March 1, 1913, the fair
market price or value of such property as of that date; and
(2) In the case of property acquired on or after that date, the cost
thereof; or the inventory value, if the inventory is made in accordance
with section 203.
Sec. 213. That for the purpose of this title * * * the term “gross
income”—
(a) Includes gains, profits, and income derived from ♦ ♦ * trades,
businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or
personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such
property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction
of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income
derived from any source whatever. * * *
No substantial changes having been made in the corresponding sec
tions of the two acts, it is assumed that both acts were intended by
congress to have the same construction, and the same basis should be
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employed in arriving at taxable gains and deductible losses upon the
sale or other disposition of property.
I am of the opinion that the date March 1, 1913, was intended to be
used as a guide in ascertaining gains derived or losses sustained, but
that the original cost should be taken into consideration, so that if there
was no gain on the entire transaction there was no taxable gain, and
if there was no loss on the entire transaction there was no deductible
loss. It follows, therefore, that in limiting the M company to the loss
sustained by it on the sale of shares of stock of the O company; that is,
the difference between cost and selling price, instead of to the difference
between March 1, 1913, value and selling price, the internal revenue
bureau acted in accordance with law. In other words, the basis to be
employed, under the acts of 1916, 1917, and 1918, for the purpose of
ascertaining the gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property
is the cost; and that in the case of property acquired prior to March 1,
1913, when its fair market value as of that date is in excess of its cost,
the taxable gain is the excess of the amount realized over such fair
market value; that when its fair market value as of March 1, 1913, is
lower than its cost, the deductible loss is the excess of such fair market
value over the amount realized therefor; and that when the property
is sold or otherwise disposed of at more than cost but at less than March
1, 1913, value, or at less than cost but at more than March 1, 1913, value,
neither taxable gain nor deductible loss results.
Replying specifically to the inquiry, I am of the opinion that where
property acquired prior to March 1, 1913, is sold or disposed of there
after—
(a) Taxable gain resulted if the selling price was higher than the
value on March 1, 1913, and if that value was higher than the cost
thereof, to the extent that the selling price exceeded the value on March
1, 1913;
(b) Taxable gain resulted if the selling price was greater than the
cost and if the cost was greater than the value on March 1, .1913, to the
extent that the selling price exceeded the cost of the property sold or
disposed of;
(c) No taxable gain or allowable loss resulted if the selling price
was greater than the value of the property on March 1, 1913, but less
than the cost thereof;
(d) An allowable loss resulted if the selling price was less than
the value on March 1, 1913, and if that value was less than the cost to
the extent of the difference between the value on March 1, 1913, and
the selling price;
(e) No taxable gain or deductible loss resulted if the selling price
was less than the value thereof on March 1, 1913, but greater than the
cost; or
(f) An allowable loss resulted if the selling price was less than the
cost and if the cost was less than the value on March 1, 1913, to the
extent that the cost of the property disposed of exceeded the selling
price thereof.
Respectfully,
H. M. Daugherty, Attorney General.
The honorable the Secretary of the Treasury.

Rulings Made Public Since Bulletin I—39.
Section 201, Article 1541: Dividends.
dividends: section 201, revenue act of 1918.
When a corporation declares, subsequent to January 1, 1918, a
stock dividend equal in amount to the earnings and profits accumu
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lated since February 28, 1913, and then declares a cash dividend,
such cash dividend constitutes a taxable distribution under section
201 of the revenue act of 1918.
A stock dividend equal in amount to the earnings and profits
accumulated between the close of the preceding taxable year and
the date of issuance does not make unavailable for subsequent dis
tribution after the first 60 days of a taxable year the earnings and
profits accumulated between the close of the preceding taxable year
and the date of distribution.
My opinion has been requested as to whether a stock dividend con
stitutes a distribution of earnings and profits under section 201 of the
revenue act of 1918. The issue arises in connection with two ques
tions: (1) Whether a cash dividend distributed subsequent to the issu
ance of a stock dividend equal in amount to the earnings and profits
accumulated since February 28, 1913, is a distribution from earnings and
profits accumulated prior to March 1, 1913; and (2) whether a cash
dividend distributed after the first 60 days of a taxable year, and sub
sequent to a stock dividend which is equal in amount to the earnings
and profits accumulated between the close of the preceding taxable year
and the date of issuance, distributes the earnings and profits accumulated
between the close of the preceding taxable year and the date of issuance
or the earnings and profits accumulated during the preceding taxable
years.
Section 201 of the revenue act of 1918 provides as follows:
(a) That the term “dividend” when used in this title (except in
paragraph (10) of subdivision (a) of section 234) means (1) any dis
tribution made by a corporation, other than a personal service corpora
tion, to its shareholders or members, whether in cash or in other property
or in stock of the corporation, out of its earnings or profits accumulated
since February 28, 1913, or (2) any such distribution made by a personal
service corporation out of its earnings or profits accumulated since
February 28, 1913, and prior to January 1, 1918.
(b) Any distribution shall be deemed to have been made from
earnings or profits unless all earnings and profits have first been dis
tributed. Any distribution made in the year 1918 or any year thereafter
shall be deemed to have been made from earnings or profits accumulated
since February 28, 1913, or in the case of a personal service corporation,
from the most recently accumulated earnings or profits; but any earnings
or profits accumulated prior to March 1, 1913, may be distributed in
stock dividends or otherwise, exempt from the tax, after the earnings
and profits accumulated since February 28/1913, have been distributed.
(c) A dividend paid in stock of the corporation shall be considered
income to the amount of the earnings or profits distributed. Amounts
distributed in the liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as pay
ments in exchange for stock or shares, and any gain or profit realized
thereby shall be taxed to the distributee as other gains or profits.
(d) If any stock dividend (1) is received by a taxpayer between
January 1 and November 1, 1918, both dates inclusive, or (2) is during
such period bona fide authorized or declared, and entered on the books
of the corporation, and is received by a taxpayer after November 1,
1918, and before the expiration of 30 days after passage of this act, then
such dividend shall, in the manner provided in section 206, be taxed to
the recipient at the rates prescribed by law for the years in which the
corporation accumulated the earnings or profits from which such dividend
was paid, but the dividend shall be deemed to have been paid from the
most recently accumulated earnings or profits.
(e) Any distribution made during the first 60 days of any taxable
year shall be deemed to have been made from earnings or profits accumu
lated during preceding taxable years; but any distribution made during
the remainder of the taxable year shall be deemed to have been made
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from earnings or profits accumulated between the close of the preceding
taxable year and the date of distribution, to the extent of such earnings
or profits, and if the books of the corporation do not show the amount
of such earnings or profits, the earnings or profits for the accounting period
within which the distribution was made shall be deemed, to have been
accumulated ratably during such period.
Is a stock dividend a distribution within the meaning of the above
section? It will be noted that subdivision (a) of section 201 defines
dividends as a distribution in cash, property, or stock of the corporation
to its shareholders or members out of earnings or profits accumulated
since February 28, 1913, except in the case of personal service corpora
tions. This subdivision is premised upon the proposition that a stock
dividend is a taxable distribution. On the assumption that it is such a
distribution, there is included within the definition of a dividend a stock
dividend. Congress does not define a stock dividend as a distribution
but, on the other hand, treats a distribution in stock as a dividend for
the purposes of the act. This is made clear by a realization that sub
division (a) was inserted in the act not for the purpose of determining
from a corporate standpoint how a distribution should be allocated but
rather to define a term used in other sections of the act which make
the receipt of the thing defined income. In other words, section 201 (a)
does not affect the corporation, but points out to a stockholder when
he receives taxable income.
Subdivision (b) of section 201 contains the presumption that dis
tributions shall be deemed to have been made from earnings and profits
unless they have all been distributed, and further that any distributions
made in the year 1918, or thereafter, are made from earnings or profits
accumulated since February 28, 1913 (except in the case of a personal
service corporation). It then provides that earnings or profits accumu
lated prior to March 1, 1913, may be distributed in stock dividends or
otherwise exempt from tax after the earnings and profits accumulated
since February 28, 1913, have been distributed. The latter part of this
subdivision is predicated upon the assumption by congress that a stock
dividend is a distribution; but whether or not it constitutes a distribu
tion, it is stated that a stock dividend out of earnings and profits accumu
lated prior to March 1, 1913, is not taxable. In other words, this sub
division does not define a stock dividend as a distribution because it is
immaterial for its purposes whether or not a stock dividend constitutes
a distribution.
Subdivisions (c) and (d) describe the amount of income and the
rates at which such income is to be taxed in the case of a stock dividend.
They do not impose a tax on a stock dividend, but only prescribe the
effect of a stock dividend for taxing purposes.
A stock dividend, therefore, is not defined as a distribution by sec
tion 201 of the revenue act of 1918. Furthermore, section 201 does not
include any distribution, but only a distribution of earnings and profits.
Subdivision (a) provides that the term “dividend” means any distribu
tion, “whether in cash or in other property or in stock of the corporation,
out of its earnings or profits accumulated since February 28, 1913.” If
a stock dividend is not a distribution of earnings and profits, it does not
come within its meaning.
The supreme court has not only held that a stock dividend is not
income to a stockholder, but has also stated that nothing is distributed
by the payment of such a dividend. In the case of Towne v. Eisner
(245 U. S. 418) the court, quoting Gibbons v. Mahon (136 U. S., 549),
said (p. 203) :
A stock dividend really takes nothing from the property of the
corporation, and adds nothing to the interests of the shareholders. Its
property is not diminished, and their interests are not increased.
And held that a stock dividend was not income under the revenue act
of 1913.
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By section 2 (a) of the revenue act of 1916, dividends were defined
to mean any distribution “made or ordered to be made by a corpora
tion * * * out of its earnings or profits accrued since March 1, 1913,
and payable to its shareholders, whether in cash or in stock of the cor
poration * * * which stock dividend shall be considered income to
the amount of its cash value.” In the case of Eisner v. Macomber (252
U. S., 189) (C. B. 3, p. 25), it was held that a stock dividend declared
in January, 1916, did not constitute taxable income to a stockholder. In
reaching its conclusion, the court declares that a stock dividend—
♦ * * is no more than a book adjustment, in essence not a dividend,
but rather the opposite; no part of the assets of the company is separated
from the common fund, nothing distributed except paper certificates that
evidence an antecedent increase in the value of the stockholder’s capital
interest resulting from an accumulation of profits by the company, but
profits so far absorbed in the business as to render it impracticable to
separate them for withdrawal and distribution. (P. 194.)
Again the court says:
A “stock dividend” shows that the company’s accumulated profits
have been capitalized instead of distributed to the stockholders or retained
as surplus available for distribution in money or in kind should oppor
tunity offer. Far from being a realization of profits of the stockholders,
it tends rather to postpone such realization, in that the fund represented
by the new stock has been transferred from surplus, to capital, and no
longer is available for actual distribution. P. 194.)
On page 195 the court answers the government’s contention that a
stock dividend constitutes a distribution as follows:
* * * the government contends that the tax “is levied on income
derived from corporate earnings,” when in truth the stockholder has
“derived” nothing except paper certificates,, which, so far as they have
any effect, deny him present participation in such earnings. It contends
that the tax may be laid when earnings “are received by the stockholder,”
whereas he has received none; that the profits are “distributed by means
of a stock dividend,” although a stock dividend distributes no profits;
that under the act of 1916 “the tax is on the stockholder’s share in
corporate earnings,” when in truth a stockholder has no such share, and
receives none in a stock dividend; that “the profits are segregated from
his former capital, and he has a separate certificate representing his
invested profits or gains,” whereas there has been no segregation of
profits, nor has he any separate certificate representing a personal gain,
since the certificates, new and old, are alike in what they represent—a
capital interest in the entire concerns of the corporation.” (P. 195.)
The above quotations, and especially the italicized parts, conclusively
answer any argument to the effect that there is a distribution of earnings
and profits by a stock dividend. When the court held that the receipt
of a stock dividend was not the receipt of income by a stockholder, it
necessarily held that there was no division among stockholders of earnings
and profits, according to a former decision in M. & O. R. R. v. Tennessee
(153 U. S., 486, 496), where a distribution was defined to mean “that
portion of its profits which the corporation, by its directory, sets apart
for ratable division among its shareholders.”
Congress has provided in section 201 (b) of the revenue act of 1918
that any distribution made in the year 1918, or any year thereafter, is
made from earnings or profits accumulated since February 28, 1913.
(S. O. 140, Bulletin I—19—263, p. 7.) Consequently, if a stock dividend
does not constitute a distribution of earnings and profits, any cash dividend
declared must be from any earnings or profits accumulated subsequent
to February 28, 1913, when the corporation has on hand earnings and
profits accumulated prior to March 1, 1913. Also subdivision (e) of
section 201 provides that any distribution made after the first 60 days
of a taxable year is made from earnings and profits accumulated between
the close of the preceding taxable year and the date of the distribution
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to the extent of such earnings and profits. In other words, irrespective
of whether or not a stock dividend capitalizes earnings and profits, the
tact remains that such earnings and profits have not been distributed,
and, therefore, a cash dividend is from those earnings and profits.
Even though it may be argued that in view of the opinion of the
supreme court in the case of Eisner v. Macomber a stock dividend makes
earnings and profits unavailable for distribution, nevertheless it can not
be maintained that a stock dividend capitalizes the latest earnings and
profits because a corporate resolution attempts to allocate such a dividend
to subsequently accumulated earnings. This follows from the fact that
the presumption that a cash dividend is declared out of the latest earnings
and profits is a statutory one, and has been held to be conclusive (S./O.
140), and also because a corporation is unable to earmark or fix as
capital or capital stock any particular earnings. (Canal & Banking Co. v.
Moran, 99 U. S., 99; Anderson v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 241 Fed.,
328.)
In view of the above, it is clear that a stock dividend does not con
stitute a distribution of earnings and profits within the meaning of section
201 of the revenue act of 1918.
Therefore, in my opinion, (1) when a corporation declares, subse
quent to January 1, 1918, a stock dividend equal in amount to the earnings
and profits accumulated since February 28, 1913, and then declares a
cash dividend, such cash dividend constitutes a taxable distribution under
section 201 of the revenue act of 1918; and (2) a stock dividend equal
in amount to the earnings and profits accumulated between the close of
the preceding taxable year and the date of issuance does not make
unavailable for subsequent distribution after the first 60 days of a tax
able year the earnings and profits accumulated between the close of the
preceding taxable year and the date of distribution.
Section 204, Article 1601: Net loss, definition and computation.
SECTION 204—REVENUE ACT OF 1918.

Recommended, in the appeal of the M Company, that the action of
the income tax unit in rejecting the said company’s claims for refund
and abatement of 1918 taxes, filed under the provisions of section
204 of the revenue act of 1918, be sustained.
The committee has had under consideration the appeal of the M
Company from the action of the income tax unit in rejecting that com
pany’s claims for the refund of x dollars income and profits taxes paid
for the calendar year 1918 and the abatement of the balance of such
taxes assessed for that year, which claims were filed under the provisions
of section 204 of the revenue act of 1918 to cover a net operating loss
sustained during the period January 1 to December 31, 1919.
The records show that the net income of the M Company for the
calendar year 1918, as adjusted by the income tax unit, amounted to
12.18x dollars and its total tax liability for the same period to 5.12x
dollars. Subsequent to the filing of the 1918 return the appellant com
pany changed its accounting period from a calendar-year to a fiscal-year
basis and the first return filed on this new basis was for the period
January 1 to July 31, 1919, which return, as adjusted by the income tax
unit, showed a net loss of ll.24.tf dollars, and it is claimed that on
December 31, 1919, a full inventory was made and a trial balance taken
from the books of the appellant company, which showed a net operating
loss of 4.52x dollars for the period August 1 to December 31, 1919; and
upon examination by a field officer it was found that for the full fiscal
year—August 1, 1919, to July 31, 1920—the appellant company had sus
tained a net operating loss of 5.01x dollars.
Accepting the appellant company’s statement that a net operating
loss of 4.52x dollars was sustained during the last five months of 1919
as true, it appears that the said company’s operations for the two-year
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period January 1, 1918, to December 31, 1919, resulted in a net operating
loss of 3.58x dollars, computed as follows:
Dollars.
Net income for calendar year 1918...................... 12.18x
Net loss for period Jan. 1 to July 31, 1919......... 11.24x
Net loss for period Aug. 1 to Dec. 31, 1919.........
4.52x
15.76x

Net loss for two-year period..................................
3.58x
And it is the net loss of 15.76x dollars incurred during the period
January 1 to December 31, 1919, which the appellant company now seeks
to have deducted from the net income for the calendar year 1918 under
the provisions of section 204, with the resultant reduction of tax liability
for that year.
The corporation in support of its appeal contends that—
* * * it was clearly the intent of congress in section 204 of the act
to provide the taxpayer with relief from excessive taxes in the war year
1918, providing it was shown that the profits on which such taxes were
based were in reality only paper profits and were dissipated by a return
to normal circumstances in the succeeding year. * * *
And it is argued that office decision 445 (C. B. 2, p. 58), the terms of
which the income tax unit holds preclude the allowance of the appellant
company’s claim—
* * * is intended to cover cases where the fraction of year under
which allowance is claimed shows a loss and the fraction necessary to
complete a full year shows a profit, the full year showing a profit or at
least a smaller loss than the fractional year. * * *
And that—
If O. D. 445 is intended to cover cases other than that outlined
above, then it is respectfully contended that it is clearly not in accord
with the intent of congress as shown in section 204 of the act.
That part of section 204 of the revenue act of 1918 which may be
deemed pertinent to the question here at issue reads as follows:
(b) If for any taxable year beginning after October 31, 1918, and
ending prior to January 1, 1920, it appears upon the production of
evidence satisfactory to the commissioner that any taxpayer has sustained
a net loss, the amount of such net loss shall under regulations prescribed
by the commissioner with the approval of the secretary be deducted from
the net income of the taxpayer for the preceding taxable year; and the
taxes imposed by this title and by Title III for such preceding taxable
year shall be redetermined accordingly. Any amount found to be due
to the taxpayer upon the basis of such redetermination shall be credited
or refunded to the taxpayer in accordance with the provisions of section
252. If such net loss is in excess of the net income for such preceding
taxable year, the amount of such excess shall under regulations
prescribed by the commissioner with the approval of the secretary
be allowed as a deduction in computing the net income for the succeeding
taxable year.
Section 200 of the revenue act of 1918 provides that—
The term “taxable year” means the calendar year, or the fiscal year
ending during such calendar year, upon the basis of which the net income
is computed under section 212 or section 232. The term “fiscal year”
means an accounting period of 12 months ending on the last day of any
month other than December. The first taxable year, to be called the
taxable year 1918, shall be the calendar year 1918 or any fiscal year
ending during the calendar year 1918.
In the instant case neither the net loss of 11.24x dollars sustained
during the period January 1 to July 31, 1919, nor the loss of 4.52x dollars
sustained during the period August 1 to December 31, 1919, is a loss
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for a full taxable year, and, therefore, neither loss is deductible under
the provisions of section 204 from the net income of the calendar year
1918, it having been held in O. D. 445 that—
If a taxpayer changes his accounting period in such manner that the
period from the close of his previous taxable year to the close of his
newly established taxable year falls between October 31, 1918, and January
1, 1920, and he sustains a net loss during such fractional year period, he
is not entitled to the relief provided by section 204 of the revenue act
of 1918, since the net loss sustained is not for a full taxable year as
provided by the act.
In the determination of income tax liability under the provisions
of the 1918 act net income or net loss must be computed with respect
to a fixed period, and, therefore, the net loss sustained in the instant
case during the taxable period January 1 to July 31, 1919, can not be
consolidated with the net loss for the period August 1 to December 31,
1919, and the net result thus obtained deducted, under the provisions
of section 204, from the appellant company’s net income for the calendar
year 1918.
In view of the foregoing, the committee recommends that the action
of the income tax unit in rejecting the M Company’s said claims for
refund and abatement be sustained.
Section 231, Article 521: Local mutual insurance
companies and like organizations.
REVENUE ACT OF 1916—SECTION 11

(a)

(TENTH) ; REVENUE ACT OF 1918—

SECTION 231 (10) ; REVENUE ACT OF 1921—SECTION 231 (10).

Recommended, in the appeal of the M Association, that the action
of the income tax unit in denying the taxpayer exemption from
taxation under the provisions of section 11 (a) (tenth) of the
revenue act of 1916, as amended, and section 231 (10) of the revenue
acts of 1918 and 1921 be sustained.
The committee has had under consideration the appeal of the M
Association from the action of the income tax unit in denying the
organization classification as one which derives its income solely from
assessments, dues and fees, and accordingly is exempt from taxation
under the provisions of section 11 (a) (tenth), revenue act of 1916,
as amended, and section 231 (10) of the revenue acts of 1918 and 1921,
It appears from the record that the M Association, originally the
N Association, was organized under the laws of the state of Y, in 1916,
without capital stock. The appellant corporation is a reciprocal indem
nity exchange, through which certain individuals, firms, and corporations
conduct a limited insurance on the reciprocal or interinsurance plan,
through an attorney in fact, the O Company, having power to issue
policies, collect premiums, and adjust losses. It further appears that
each subscriber acts individually and deposits a fixed amount to pay
losses; that such deposit is held by the attorney in fact and is kept in
a separate account in the name of the depositor, and at the end of the
period for which the insurance runs, any balance of the amount so
deposited goes to the depositor. It is also shown that the funds are
deposited in the banks or invested in securities approved by the board
of trustees, of which there are five in number, and that all disbursements
of funds are made by the attorney in fact with the approval of the board
of trustes.
The corporation has had but one office during all the time of its
operation, and up to September —, 1920, operated in one community.
During June, July, and August, 1918, ----------- policies were written
from the Y office on the automobiles of persons residing in another
state. For the year ending December 31, 1917, the appellant company
had no receipts. The attorney in fact advanced money to the associa
tion to pay its losses and expenses, and at the end of the year 1917 the
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association had a deficit of 1.52x dollars, representing the combined
amount of the losses and expenses for that year. During the year
ending December 31, 1918, the association had total receipts of 9.63x
dollars, paid losses in the amount of 2.65x dollars, and expenses of
adjustment, etc., in the amount of 1.03x dollars, or a total expenditure
of 3.68x dollars. During the year ending December 31, 1919, the total
receipts of the association amounted to 14.23x dollars, of which the sum
of .2x dollars represented interest on bank balances. It paid during this
year losses in the amount of 4.26x dollars, expenses of adjustment, etc.,
in the amount of 1.74x dollars, and taxes in the amount of .12x dollars,
or a total expenditure for the year of 6.72x dollars, leaving a balance
on hand from the operations for the year 1919 in the amount of 7.51x
dollars. This sum added to the balance of 4.42x dollars on hand at the
beginning of the year resulted in a bank balance at December 31, 1919,
of 11.93x dollars. This amount belonged to the members of the associa
tion, and was held for them and placed to their individual credit for the
payment of losses or, in the case of dissolution, to be returned to them
as credited upon the books.
Upon consideration of the foregoing facts, the income tax unit held
that the appellant corporation operates upon the premium deposit plan;
does not receive its income solely from assessments, dues, and fees col
lected from members for the sole purpose of meeting expenses, as provided
by statute; and consequently is required to file amended returns of
annual net income and pay any taxes due thereon. It is from this action
that the taxpayer appeals.
Inasmuch as the question involved appeared to be of a legal char
acter, the case was referred to the solicitor for advice and the expres
sion of an opinion. The committee is in receipt of the solicitor’s opinion,
which reads as follows:
Reference is made to the case of the M Association, being an appeal
from a decision denying the organization classification as one which
derived its income solely from assessments, dues, and fees.
The unit held that the corporation was not exempt because it operated
on the premium deposit plan and, further, because it is not local in
character.
It appears that the corporation operates on the interindemnity plan,
requiring deposits from policyholders and acting through an attorney
in fact.
It is contended that prior to----- , 1920, the organization operated
on the “post-mortem” plan, making assessments at intervals for the pur
pose of meeting claims that had been passed upon and which were due
but not passed. During the year ending December 31, 1918, the associa
tion had total receipts of 9.63x dollars and total expenditures of 3.68x
dollars. “It therefore had on hand on December 31, 1918, money advanced
by the members to the amount of 4.42x dollars, which was on deposit in
the bank.” The balance on December 31, 1919, was 11.93x dollars. The
claim for refund states: “All this money belonged to the members of
the association, and was held for them to their individual credit for the
payment of losses or, in case of dissolution, to be returned to them as
credited upon the books.”
The subscribers’ agreement submitted indicates that each subscriber
bound himself to deposit with the attorney in fact when called for by him
a sufficient sum of money to pay his proportion of losses, adjustment
expenses, etc. Subscribers’ deposits were required to be deposited in
banks or invested in securities, and upon notice of cancellation the
attorney in fact was required to liquidate the accounts and return the
unused deposit.
Article 521 of regulations 45 holds that if an organization receives
income from sources such as cash premiums or premium deposits it is
not exempt; and the question is presented whether amounts deposited
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as above outlined should be regarded as premium deposits or as assess
ments.
Solicitor’s opinion 99 (C. B. 4, p. 270) shows that “assessment”
implies a payment in which the policyholder has no further right or
claim. In other words, the essence of an assessment is that the amount
thereof is dedicated to the payment of losses or expenses incurred or
to be incurred with no right on the part of the person paying the same
to a refund of any portion thereof, while a premium deposit contemplates
a return or the right to a return to the policyholder of the part of the.
amount deposited not needed for payment of losses, etc. (See S. O. 141;
Bulletin 1—23—1922.)
The claim here is that the deposits are assessments, but that they
belong to the depositors. These claims are inconsistent. If the deposits
belong to the subscribers in the sense that they are entitled to a return
of any unused portion thereof, they do not fall within the. classification
of assessments, but do fall within the classification of premium deposits.
It seems clear from the foregoing and the general manner in which inter
indemnity exchanges are conducted, that the deposits in the instant case
fall in the latter class.
You are accordingly advised that the M Association was not entitled
to exemption as a corporation the income of which consists solely of
assessments, dues, and fees collected for the sole purpose of meeting
expenses while operating as above outlined.
In view of the foregoing opinion of the solicitor, in which the com
mittee finds itself thoroughly in accord, it is recommended in the appeal
of the M Association that the action of the income tax unit in denying
the taxpayer exemption from taxation under the provisions of section
11 (a) (tenth) of the revenue act of 1916, as amended, and section 231
(10) of the revenue acts of 1918 and 1921 be sustained.

JAMES C. MAHON

James C. Mahon, member of the American Institute of Accountants,
died suddenly at Martinsville, Indiana, September 25, 1922.
Mr. Mahon had been prominent in accounting in Kentucky for many
years and was president of the Kentucky Institute. The week before his
death he had attended the annual meeting of the American Institute of
Accountants and seemed to be in perfect health.
The funeral was held at the Fourth Avenue Presbyterian Church,
Louisville, Kentucky.
Smith, Brodie & Lunsford and Francis A. Wright & Co. announce
that they have combined their practices as of October 1, 1922, and will
hereafter practise under the name of Smith, Brodie, Lunsford & Wright,
with offices at 816 Lathrop building, Kansas City, Missouri.

Edward A. McAllister and William D. Patterson announce the
formation of a partnership under the firm name of E. A. McAllister &
Company, with offices at 2 Rector street, New York, and 8 Main street,
Yonkers, New York.

Roden & Hart of 909-912 Fourth National Bank building, Cincinnati,
Ohio, announce the admission to partnership of H. W. Weiss.

Harry L. Carpenter announces the opening of an office at 1457
Broadway, New York.
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